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[redacted]  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

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**Critical Intelligence Problems Committee**

DCI/ICS 86-3781

19 August 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

SUBJECT: Approved Terms of Reference [redacted]

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1. Attached for your information and use as appropriate are the approved terms of reference for the [redacted]

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[redacted] In addition, copies are being provided to your respective working group members. [redacted]

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2. If we can be of further assistance, please let me know. [redacted]

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[redacted]  
~~Executive Secretary~~

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Attachments: As stated

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SUBJECT: Approved Terms of Reference

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

INTELLIGENCE AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER: NFIP SUPPORT TO US MILITARY FORCES  
TERMS OF REFERENCE

## I. BACKGROUND

A. The concept of intelligence as a force multiplier is of growing interest largely because of concern about sustaining the ability of technically superior US and allied weapons systems to compensate for numerical force disadvantages. In situations where the quantity of opposing forces cannot be fully offset by the quality of weapons systems, ways must be found to improve efficiency and effectiveness of US military forces. [REDACTED]

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B. In peacetime and in support of deterrence, the force multiplier effect contributes to the planning and management of US forces and the acquisition of weapon systems. Intelligence defines targets and threats and provides technical data for the design of weapon systems. [REDACTED]

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C. For warfighting, strategic and tactical intelligence can multiply, or enhance, the combat effectiveness of military forces by enabling deployments and maneuvers that take maximum advantage of the situation (battle management) and by quickly and accurately locating hostile units for attack (targeting). These functions apply to all levels of warfare in all theaters and in all operational environments, not just to the dominant scenario involving NATO defense in central Europe against numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces. [REDACTED]

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D. While there is a general perception that national intelligence assets are of significant value to military operating forces, there is also a certain apprehension about their actual availability to these forces. This is a central issue which must be squarely addressed. [REDACTED]

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## II. PURPOSE

The study will explain the general principles underlying the concept of intelligence as a force multiplier, using both logic and historical anecdote. It will discuss the theater warfighting intelligence requirements of US ground, air, and naval forces for battle management and targeting purposes; identify the contributions of military intelligence assets toward meeting these requirements; evaluate the potential of NFIP resources to narrow gaps which remain; and recommend DCI actions accordingly. [REDACTED]

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## III. GENERAL APPROACH

- o Concept of Intelligence as a Force Multiplier.
  - General principles (i.e., the logic) underlying the concept.
- o At the outset, the following categories of military roles and activities will be discussed in general terms regarding the multiplier effect:
  - Peacetime
    - Strategic Nuclear Planning
    - Systems Design and Countermeasures
    - Training, equipping, and organizing the forces
  - Crisis
    - Preparation for Conflict
    - Contingency Operations
  - Theater Warfighting
    - Battle Management
    - Battlefield Targeting and Execution
- o Concentration will be given to theater warfighting as follows:
  - Preparation for Theater warfighting: organizing, equipping and training the forces.
    - Current and future Intelligence Requirements/Needs of the Fighting Forces, Naval, Air and Ground.
    - The Theater Intelligence Architecture Program of the OSD/DIA.
    - The Defense-wide Intelligence Plan (D-WIP) for supporting warfighting capabilities including perspectives of tactical operational commanders and the CINCs of unified and specified commands and of other military leaders. (S/NF)
  - Historical/anecdotal--how the assets and resources of the NFIP have made a difference in the past, i.e., how they have "multiplied," or contributed to, the effectiveness of US military forces.
  - Contributions of Intelligence for Satisfying Requirements.
    - Assets controlled by the military forces--general assessment.
    - NFIP resources:
      - Processing
      - Collection (all sources.)
      - Analysis and production.

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Dissemination and other matters pertaining to the availability of and access to intelligence (the roles of the Senior Executive Planning Committee, the TENCAP organizations of the services, and the NFIP/TIARA Review Board).

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- Narrowing Gaps and Recommendations.

-- Concerning improvements in the contributions of NFIP resources and programs.

-- By the various intelligence disciplines.  
Organizational arrangements.

-- Concerning appropriate ways to reflect the findings of the study in the generation of the NFIP budget.

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#### IV. ADMINISTRATION

A. This study will be conducted by a working group consisting of selected Intelligence Community representatives. Its Chairman will be responsible for conducting the study and ensuring that the report is submitted to the Executive Secretary, CIPC, by the end of November so that the study may be reviewed at the December meeting of the CIPC.

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APPROVED:

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Chairman, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

13 Aug 56  
Date

DISAPPROVED:

Chairman, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

Date

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